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3 August 1971

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TO : [REDACTED] DD/OCI

FROM : [REDACTED] Res/NIS *J.B.M.*

SUBJECT: Personnel procedures for those working on NIS tasks

1. This memo derives from our recent conversation on this subject and your suggestion that I draft a proposed procedural memo which the front office might issue by way of ensuring a more precise and more widely competitive evalutation of performance on NIS work.

2. The draft procedure which follows rests on several underlying assumptions. One (which has already been set forth in previous memoes and has, I believe, been accepted in principle) is that some special procedures are required for rating those who are primarily NIS producers, because their work differs significantly from most current intelligence in its nature and in the way it is handled in OCI. The second assumption is that, to have the needed effect on producers' motivations, these special procedures need to be explicit and generally known. The third assumption is that the front office, though needing to make effectively evident its interest in the proper evaluation of NIS production, cannot effectively review the NIS performance of all producers in the regional divisions in addition to those (in the Research Staff) whose responsibility to the front office is a direct one. The fourth assumption is that there are two key categories of intelligence officer in the regional divisions who, by reason of their positions there are ready subject to front office review in their overall performance and that, if such review more specifically addressed itself to their NIS responsibilities, it would indirectly serve to improve the quality of NIS work performed by those administratively and substantively responsible to these officers. These two key categories are (1) the branch chiefs, who are generally the immediate supervisors of the NIS writers and the last point of full substantive review of an NIS section inside OCI, and (2) the five regional research officers who generally oversee NIS production in the producing divisions.

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3. The suggested procedural memo for issuance by the D/OCI would go along the following lines:

The following adjustment is made in OCI personnel procedures in order to give the office of the D/OCI and the Career Service Board fuller information on the performance of those in the GS-13 through GS-15 category who are substantially concerned with NIS production and to assure that promotions in these categories will be directly competitive throughout OCI. Special provisions are necessary for those with substantial NIS responsibilities inasmuch as NIS contributions, unlike most other OCI products, normally pass out of the office laterally after review at about the branch chief level and can not be expected to come to the attention of Career Service Board members. Whenever any promotion request is made for someone in the two categories of officer indicated below, therefore, the office of the D/OCI will request through channels from the unit now known as Res/NIS, an evaluation of the officer's performance as regards NIS production.

- (a) The five regional research officers who generally oversee NIS production in the regional divisions will be fully evaluated in these reports as to the degree of responsibility shown in the full range of OCI's NIS production, from initial scheduling of the regional division's NIS commitments, through the editing and review of drafts for their responsiveness to NIS requirements, to the adequate handling of revisions in final conferences with OBGI.
- (b) Branch chiefs who have had NIS sections produced during the period in question on any countries under their jurisdiction will be briefly evaluated as to the degree of responsibility shown in providing adequate manpower and in ensuring suitable substantive review.

In addition to this procedure on promotion requests, the office of D/OCI when reviewing annual fitness reports on officers in these categories will, where appropriate, request from the same source an evaluation of the officer's NIS performance.

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Attachments

Annual Report to D/OCI of 7/16/71

Memo to D/OCI of 1/13/71  
re OCI promotion procedures

Excerpt (Para. 9) from Annual  
report to D/OCI of 7/23/70

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16 July 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Current Intelligence  
SUBJECT : OCI's NIS Performance in FY 71

1. This report takes a different turn from the corresponding reports for previous fiscal years, a difference occasioned mainly by the present D/OBGI's change of emphasis in NIS production from the meeting of deadlines to improving the quality of the present General Survey and its gradual restructuring to a livelier and more flexible medium. Accordingly, last year's detailed statistical analysis of OCI's record at submitting and processing its contributions on time is replaced this year with a rather simple summary of where we stood on FY 71 commitments when OBGI closed the books on the year, in accordance with its usual custom, shortly after the Independence Day holiday (9 July). This summary is presented in Annex A with a tabulation, like that requested last year, of the specific NIS sections which were delinquent at the end of the year and the main discernible reasons for this delinquency. In sum, it shows 11 delinquent sections out of a total of 98 sections on the adjusted schedule for the year, as contrasted with only one delinquent section at the end of FY 70 out of the 100 scheduled for that year.

2. As Annex A shows in detail, a majority of the 11 missed deadlines are directly attributable to the change (now largely accomplished) over to the new "thematic" introductory section from the rather routine Section 1 of the past, and to the change (still in process) to a more condensed insurgency coverage from the former Section 9 on the subject. Both changes require a degree of redrafting which many OCI-ers find it difficult to associate with NIS production. A number of people in the office--notably the three NIS-R. O. s then responsible for the Far East, Middle East, and Africa respectively--responded to the challenge positively and effectively, as have some branch chiefs; others have not yet mustered the needed flexibility and skill. In addition, some of the delays on the Sections 4 (Sociological) and 5 (Political) are indirectly attributable to the D/OBGI's new emphases, in that some OCI analysts have proved very reluctant to accept his policies banning unnecessary repetitions and "sentences which seem to say something but actually don't." The immediate

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practical consequences of these local reluctances and learning lags are not serious, since the changes made thus far in the structure of the General Survey have produced a sizable--though temporary--traffic jam in OBG's part of the NIS production process.

3. Sooner or later, however, a renewal of old pressures to meet deadlines must be anticipated, if only because some scheduling arrangements are essential to cope with so high a volume of publishing traffic, deriving from a number of different contributors. The cause for anxiety, in my view, is on the score of timing--as to whether the OBG traffic jam (which now, so to speak, protects us) will be dissolved before OCI analysts are fully adjusted to the new NIS requirements. Nor is this all. Further changes in the NIS requirements are to be expected (e.g., in the introductions to "Land and People" and to "Government and Politics," as well as in scheduling), and these will demand further flexibility on the part of the OCI analysts who must implement the new concepts. Of the OCI inflexibilities which have surfaced thus far, the most serious to deal with is not an unwillingness to accept a specific change in a specific NIS ground rule so much as the general inability to appreciate that what may have been good enough for the NIS in the Bower regime of the mid 1960's is not good enough for the King era of the early 1970's--or even now relevant. To state the situation figuratively in terms of the much cited environmental crisis, our problem is partly the number of people who still believe that black smoke pouring out of factory chimneys is A Good Thing.

4. Directly related to the needed changes in attitudes toward NIS work are certain administrative changes regarding the rating and rewarding of NIS work in OCI. As my annual report for FY 70 noted in more detail, NIS production normally passes out of the office laterally, at about the branch chief level, providing little opportunity for an individual's work to reach the attention of anyone on Career Service Board level or to be compared with the NIS work of anyone outside his own division. It was then recommended (and the recommendation repeated in the material prepared for the OCI chiefs' discussions at Warrenton in April 1971) that regular procedures be instituted for a representative of the front office to consult Res/NIS (and, if necessary, OBG) at Fitness Report time and at promotion time regarding the NIS performance of individuals giving major attention to such work. It has been since intimated that

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such a recommendation is regarded by the front office as reasonable in principle, and some informal consultations have in fact been initiated by the DD/OCI. But for working level motivations to be adequately affected, something more formal and explicit than this would seem to be needed.

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[REDACTED]  
Deputy for NIS, Research Staff, OCI

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Annex A: NIS General Survey Sections Delinquent\* at end of FY 71

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Main reasons for delay and present status

Yugoslavia 1 Thematic Sec 1 proved difficult; first draft now being worked on by branch chief.

North Vietnam 1 Thematic Sec 1, after several redrafts, delivered to OBGI on 14 July.

France 1 Thematic 1 draft still being planned by analyst.

Finance 5 Draft given preliminary Res/NIS review proved insufficiently revised since 1968; revision has gone slowly since return to branch on 9 June.

Syria 1 Drafting of Thematic Sec 1 awaits completion of Sec 5.

Syria 4 Analyst rather slow worker, further delayed by approach of maternity leave (11 June on); other commitments kept branch short of manpower, but section despatched to OBGI on 15 July.

Syria 5 Not finished when analyst's maternity leave started (11 June); remaining parts being completed by others in branch.

Syria 9 Delayed by uncertainty on new means of insurgency coverage; now (15 July) being gradually incorporated in Sec 5.

\*The revised schedule of OGI's commitments for FY 71 called for a total of 98 sections of which 37 had been actually despatched by the date (9 July 1971) which OBGI chose for closing the books on FY 71. Originally, the schedule called for 102 sections but, with the concurrence of the NIS Committee, the section 3 (Subversion and Insurgency) on Cambodia was cancelled, and all three sections on Pakistan were postponed to the following fiscal year.

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Country &  
Section

Analyst

Branch  
Chief

Main reaons for delay and present status

El Salvador 1

Thematic Sec 1 still in preliminary draftin stage.

El Salvador 4

Branch still refusing to make adjustments indicated as necessary by Res/NIS on 20 April.

El Salvador 5

Branch still refusing to make adjustments indicated as necessary by Res/NIS on 7 June

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13 January 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Lehman  
Director of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT : NIS production and your memo of 12/31/70,  
"Promotion Procedures in OCI"

1. I bring the following considerations to your attention directly because, in my view, they are directly relevant to the problem of NIS production in OCI and to the officially-denied but widely-held stereotype that NIS producers are "second class citizens" in OCI.
2. My point is that the aim stated in your Para. 3, of making OCI promotions to GS-13 through GS-15 "directly competitive" throughout the Office, is not effectively implemented where NIS work is substantially involved. In contrast to most items of current intelligence, the NIS production of one regional division is unlikely to be seen by senior officials elsewhere in the Office and is usually unseen even by the division chief substantively responsible for it. Discussion of promotion under these circumstances almost necessarily reduces to the syllogism: "I, Division Chief John Doe, want my analyst Richard Roe promoted; Richard Roe is a qualified analyst long associated with NIS work; ergo, Richard Roe should be promoted--among other reasons, to give due recognition to NIS work." No mechanism is provided to compare the quality of Richard Roe's NIS work with that of Harry Hoe in another regional division; furthermore, if the NIS worker up for promotion is one of the three NIS professionals on the Research Staff, he does not even have anyone on the Career Service Board to speak particularly for him as the divisional NIS worker does.
3. Since news of promotions eventually leak out, no matter how closely held, and since the promoted analyst's "peer group" of other NIS workers generally stand on fairly firm ground for assessing each others' performance, actions like those outlined in Para. 2 above are not without their side-effects. I may add that I am not just theorizing on this point; some rather strong comments along this line have come to me privately from OCI people (not in Res/NIS) who have demonstrated competence in NIS work.

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9. I also have one formal change to suggest in OCI's personnel procedures as a means of putting performance on the NIS more on a par with that in other aspects of the Office's substantive work. OCI intelligence officers have in various instances been promoted on the ground that they have performed well on the NIS, but I would question whether they are really rated on the same competitive basis as those concerned mainly with current intelligence. For the reasons indicated in Para # 5 above and in Annex C, even their own division chief is unlikely to have any first-hand acquaintance with their NIS work and the other members of the Career Service Board will have had even less. Reliance may be placed on complimentary remarks made by State Department or Embassy reviewers concerning their NIS drafts, but such laudatory quotations are not always to be

taken at face value. Sometimes they are only a polite preface to sharp criticism later; seldom are they based on a familiarity with many NIS documents (the reviewer himself being usually a specialist on a narrow area); and in any case the external reviewer is in no position to know how much of the work is the reputed author's and how much the supervisor's and reviewers'. (A recent case in point is the comment on Zambia Sec 5 made by the US Ambassador in Lusaka A-165 of 25 June, that "the analyst is to be congratulated on the lucidity and accuracy of his draft." The original draft of this section was the work of [redacted] but was considered by everyone else concerned with it to be an unusually weak effort, and by the time the section reached the Ambassador, [redacted] had become a very minor stockholder.) Various reviewers in OBGI and in Res/NIS, of course, have a much broader basis for evaluating performance on the NIS, yet I can recall only two or three occasions (all from the same division) when my professional opinion was solicited about an NIS-producer at Fitness Report time. I would be very chary of having my opinion about one regional division's NIS performance cited to its fellow divisions, but I would consider it appropriate for the front office reviewing officer of the Fitness Reports on Branch Chiefs and R. O.s to have Res/NIS views on these officers' NIS production to use as he thought suitable in reviewing the ratings given them. (OBGI reviewers might also be discreetly queried.) And, if such a procedure were to be instituted, I would think it psychologically useful for public announcement of the fact to be made.

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